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1. Background 
 
Under the 1993 Constitution, elections take place to the lower house of the 
Russian parliament, the State Duma, every four years. The detailed 
procedures are set out in a series of more specific laws, on electoral 
procedures in general and on the Duma election in particular. There is a 
separate election to the presidency every four years, most recently in March 
2008. Following the December 2007 Duma election, President Putin 
suggested that the two campaigns might be more clearly separated in time, to 
avoid an ‘endless sequence of elections’.1 In practice, up to the present, the 
presidential campaign begins almost immediately the Duma results have been 
declared; indeed, the Duma election has, not unreasonably, been described 
as a ‘presidential primary’ (Shevtsova, 2003). 
 
2. Electoral system 
 
The current Duma election law, adopted in 2005 as part of a series of 
measures designed to strengthen executive authority (following a hostage-
taking crisis in Beslan, northern Caucasus), departs in important respects 
from those that preceded it. In particular, it dropped the requirement that 225 
of the Duma’s 450 seats be allocated to single-member constituencies 
throughout the country, with the result determined by simple majority. From 
2007 onwards the new Duma was to be composed entirely of deputies 
elected by party list, subject to a 7% (previously 5%) threshold, with the 
allocation of seats determined by the ‘Hare’ system (Election Law, Art. 83). An 
amendment to the law in 2006 removed the previous opportunity to vote 
‘against all’ candidates and party lists. Another amendment, in 2007, removed 
the minimum turnout requirement, which had previously been 25%.2 The 
effect of these and other changes was to strengthen even further the 
Kremlin’s ability to secure a parliament dominated by its supporters but with a 
smaller element of (largely token) opposition.  
 Under the election law, elections are called by the President, and take place 
on the first Sunday of the month in which the constitutional powers of the 
outgoing Duma expire. Putin signed a decree to this effect on 2 September, 
calling the election for Sunday, 2 December 2007. Under the terms of the new 
election law, parties represented in the outgoing Duma have the right to 
nominate a list of candidates without further formalities. Other parties must 
either submit to the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) the signatures of at 
least 200,000 electors or pay an electoral deposit of 60 m roubles (about $2.5 
m). If more than 5% of the signatures are invalid, or if the number of 
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1 Izvestiya, 4 December 2007, p. 3. 
2 For Russian speakers, the current law, incorporating these changes, may be consulted at the Central 
Electoral Commission’s website: www.cikrf.ru.
signatures falls below the minimum (once invalid signatures have been 
excluded), the party is refused registration. This decision may be challenged 
in the Supreme Court.  
 The CEC completed its deliberations on 28 October. Of the 14 parties 
seeking registration, three were represented in the outgoing Duma: United 
Russia, the Communist Party, and the Liberal-Democratic Party. Four parties 
registered by paying the electoral deposit: Union of Right Forces, Yabloko, 
Patriots of Russia, and Fair Russia. The remaining parties sought to register 
by collecting signatures. Three were found to have an excessive number of 
invalid signatures (the Greens, the People’s Union, and the Peace and Unity 
Party), but the Agrarian Party, Civic Force, the Democratic Party of Russia, 
and the Party of Social Justice satisfied the legal requirements. Thus 11 
parties eventually appeared on the ballot paper, with a total of 4684 
candidates on their lists.3
3. Electoral campaign 
 
From the start of the campaign, there were no doubts that the Kremlin’s 
favoured party, United Russia, would take the larger share of the vote and 
seats. But it was important to the government that turnout be at such a level 
that the outcome could not seriously be questioned, so the government’s 
candidate for the presidential election in March 2008 (Dmitri Medvedev) would 
start as the clear favourite. It was also important that United Russia should 
win at least two-thirds of the Duma’s seats so that it had the majority 
necessary to pass federal constitutional laws as well as ordinary legislation. In 
the event, United Russia chose to associate itself very closely with the 
Russian president, presenting itself as ‘Putin’s party’ and the election itself as 
a ‘referendum on Putin’. 
 The voting forecasts published by the Levada Centre and other leading 
agencies left little doubt that United Russia would dominate the new Duma, 
and that the result was likely to be a massive endorsement of ‘Putin’s plan’. 
Accordingly, there was a certain logic to the Russian president agreeing to 
head the United Russia list, although he was not – and did not become – a 
party member. Moreover, Putin’s occasional addresses set the tone of the 
campaign.  
 A rally for his supporters at Luzhniki stadium in Moscow was particularly 
notable as the first speech in which Putin called directly for Russia’s electors 
to support United Russia. It contained a sharp attack on the integrity of his 
political opponents, accusing them of ‘‘slinking around Western embassies’’ 
for their support.4 In that speech and in others, including an address to the 
diplomatic corps shortly before election day, Putin repeatedly insisted that 
Russia would not allow its political choices to be ‘‘corrected from outside’’.5
Official spokesmen made clear that they had in the mind the way in which (in 
their view) the electoral process in other post-Soviet republics had been used 
to set off a series of ‘coloured revolutions’ that had actually been intended to 
convert them into Western clients. 
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United Russia called its manifesto ‘‘Putin’s Plan: A worthy future for a great 
country’’.6 Russia, it was claimed, was following a strategy to ensure that it 
became one of the ‘‘world centres of political and economic influence, cultural 
and moral attraction’’, a strategy that guaranteed a ‘‘new quality of life for all 
the country’s citizens’’. During the coming four years it would mean ‘‘the 
further development of Russia as a unique civilisation’’, a more competitive 
economy, and the full implementation of the ‘‘national projects’’ that Putin first 
set out in a speech to the government in September 2005. The ‘projects’ 
included health, education, housing, and agriculture. There would also be 
‘‘significant increases’’ in pay and pensions, support for the institutions of civil 
society, and a further strengthening of Russian sovereignty and defensive 
capacity to give Russia a ‘‘worthy place in a multipolar world’’. Putin was 
described as Russia’s ‘‘national leader’’, which had the ‘‘political support’’ of 
United Russia.  
 Only two of the other parties could be regarded as serious competitors, 
although hardly an electoral challenge. The Communist Party of the Russian 
Federation, led by Gennadii Zyuganov, had won seats in all the previous 
Duma elections, although it had been conspicuously less successful in 2003 
(12.6% of the vote) than in earlier contests. The party had traditionally 
appealed to left-wing opinion, and to those who were nostalgic for the social 
guarantees of the Soviet era (and were often older than other voters), but it 
also appealed to a ‘national-patriotic’ constituency. In this latter respect, its 
position did not differ from that of the Kremlin itself. The list, headed by 
Zyuganov, included Nobel laureate Zhores Alferov and Nikolai Kharitonov, the 
party’s candidate in the 2004 presidential candidate. Zyuganov’s stance was 
that the Communist Party would seek to destroy the ‘‘three-way alliance of 
bureaucrats, oligarchs and bandits’’ running the country, and to safeguard the 
interests of ordinary people through a more ‘‘equitable distribution of the 
national wealth’’.7
The other party was Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s Liberal-Democratic Party of 
Russia (LDPR). The party appealed to a more stridently nationalist 
constituency, but its appeal normally owed a great deal to Zhirinovsky himself. 
Zhirinovsky had led the party since its foundation in 1990 and was an 
outspoken, charismatic campaigner. The LDPR’s list was headed by Andrei 
Lugovoi (wanted in the United Kingdom in connection with the murder of 
former KGB agent Alexander Litvinenko) and included Zhirinovsky and his 
son Igor Lebedev. The LDPR manifesto represented the party as the 
country’s ‘‘constructive opposition’’. So far, it claimed, only officials and 
oligarchs had gained from 16 years of economic reform, and called for oil and 
gas resources to be taken back from the oligarchs; it also called for a 
progressive income tax, with the rich paying more. And there should be an 
‘‘active multivector foreign policy’’, with its primary emphasis on Russia’s 
southern neighbours and the possibility of the voluntary reintegration of the 
former Soviet republics into a new ‘Russian Empire’.8
Of the other parties, Fair Russia was a combination of Rodina (a broadly 
‘left-patriotic’ party that had fought the previous election as a Kremlin-friendly 
opposition), together with the Pensioners’ Party and the Russian Party of Life. 
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A socialist perspective for Russia, claimed the party’s manifesto, involved a 
socially oriented economy, a strong state under democratic control, and a 
dynamically developing society. It also meant policies that reflected the 
interests of the majority of the population, a fair distribution of incomes, 
protection from poverty and official arbitrariness, social security, and 
accessible health and educational systems. Fair Russia shared the LDPR’s 
view that taxation should be more progressive, and that salaries should be 
raised for all who worked in the state sector. Not surprisingly, given the party’s 
origins, there was a considerable emphasis on pensions.9 Yabloko and the 
Union of Right Forces, as in previous elections, appealed most directly to 
those who shared their commitment to broadly western and liberal-democratic 
values. Debate among these various choices was limited by United Russia’s 
refusal to take part in television discussions, although – like the other parties – 
it took full advantage of its opportunities for free radio, television, and 
newspaper publicity. 
 
4. Election results 
 
The exit polls reported by national television as soon as the last polling 
stations had shut were very close to the final results and very close to the 
forecasts made during the campaign by the main survey agencies.10 The 
results, accordingly, were hardly a surprise. From the official standpoint, there 
was evident satisfaction that the results were very close to the final survey 
predictions, which suggested that falsification of whatever kind had been 
minimal.11 
Turnout was relatively high: 63.7%. Certainly, higher than the 55.8% 
recorded in 2003. Commenting on the results, Putin was gratified by the 
confidence placed in United Russia’s list of candidates; and he was pleased 
that the four parties that reached the threshold had, between them, secured 
90% of the vote (the outgoing Duma represented only 70% of the vote). This, 
Putin thought, would enhance the legitimacy of the new Duma.12 A more 
obvious consequence was that, with 64% of the vote and 70% of the seats in 
the hands of United Russia, and with two of the other three parties that had 
won seats favourably disposed towards it, the new Duma would be even more 
completely in the hands of the Kremlin administration (Table 1). 
 
Table 1 
Results of the Duma election in Russia, 2 December 2007. 
 
Party Votes Votes (%) Seats 
United Russia 44714241 64.3 315 
Communist Party of the Russian Federation 8046886 11.6 57 
Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia 5660823 8.1 40 
9 Rossiiskaya gazeta, 14 November 2007, p. 18. 
10See, for instance, the Levada Centre’s monthly forecasts at 
http://www.russiavotes.org/duma/duma_vote_trends.php#008 (accessed 27.06.08.) 
11 See the Levada Centre’s forecast of 30 November at http://www.levada.ru/press/2007120304.html 
(accessed 27.06.08.), which put United Russia on 62.8% and the Communists on 11.2%. Other 
forecasts and he exit polls are reported in Izvestiya, 5 December 2007, p. 2. 
12 Izvestiya, 4 December 2007, p. 3. For a fuller account, including evidence from a post-election 
survey on voting choices, see McAllister and White (2008). 
Fair Russia: Rodina/Pensioners/Life  5383639 7.7 38 
Agrarian Party of Russia 1600234 2.3 - 
Yabloko 1108985 1.5 - 
Civic Force 733604 1.1 - 
Union of Right Forces 669444 1.0 - 
Patriots of Russia 615417 0.9 - 
Party of Social Justice 154083 0.2 - 
Democratic Party of Russia 89780 0.1 - 
Electorate 109145517   
Vote cast 69537065   
Invalid votes 759929 1.1 - 
Turnout  63.7  
Source: based on the Central Electoral Commission communiqué published in Vestnik 
Tsentral’noi izbiratel’noi komissii Rossiiskoi Federatsii no. 19 (222), 2007, pp. 5–22. 
 
Although there could be no question that Putin and United Russia enjoyed a 
high level of public support, the Council of Europe/OSCE observation mission 
was less satisfied about the manner in which the victory was achieved. The 
merging of party and state was an ‘‘abuse of political power and a clear 
violation of international commitments and standards’’; the media had been 
heavily biased in favour of Putin and United Russia; the new election law 
made it extremely difficult for smaller parties to compete; and there had been 
‘‘widespread reports of harassment of opposition parties’’.13 Moreover, there 
was no larger mission from the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and 
Human Rights, as in previous elections, because the OSCE was unable to 
accept the terms on which it was invited to operate. Indeed, there was some 
indication that the Russian authorities would seek to question the entire 
international monitoring framework. 
 
5. Effects 
 
The election had no direct implications for the composition of the Russian 
government; under the Constitution, the government is accountable to the 
president rather than parliament. However, it established a propitious 
environment for the government to advance its favoured candidate to the 
presidency: first deputy Prime Minister, Dmitri Medvedev. On 17 December it 
was announced that United Russia and three other minor parties had agreed 
to nominate him as their candidate for the presidency, with Putin’s explicit 
support. The following day Medvedev indicated that he would nominate Putin 
to the premiership if he, Medvedev, was successful in the presidential election 
due on 2 March 2008. This resolved the succession question that had 
troubled domestic and foreign opinion for some years – what would happen 
when Putin stepped down, as he was obliged to do, at the end of his second 
consecutive term – and left the constitution unaltered. It was less clear if it 
would be a temporary change or a more enduring departure from what had 
otherwise been a heavily, even super-presidential, system. 
 
13 See http://assembly.coe.int/asp/press/stoppressview.asp?id¼1979 (accessed 27.06.08.). 
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